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The European Commission, Expert Groups, and the Policy Process

Julia Metz

Metz

Day by day, the European Commission consults with more than 30,000 experts that convene in about 1,000 expert groups. I argue that in order to understand the ubiquity of expert groups we need to look at how and why the European Commission uses its expert groups in the policy process. In my new book ‘The European Commission, Expert Groups, and the Policy Process: Demystifying Technocratic Governance’ (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2015) I show that expert groups are important for the Commission, because they not only solve technical problems, but also function as political devices and negotiators in EU policy making.

The European Commission is at the center of the European Union’s (EU) political system. With its quasi-monopoly on the initiation of legislation it strongly influences the rules that govern the daily lives of European citizens. When drafting European legislation the European Commission consults regularly with about 1,000 expert groups. These Commission expert groups are part of the EU committee system, which is largely regarded as the embodiment of EU technocracy. As a potential bias towards technocracy is feared to decrease political or democratic considerations in the EU policy process, the Commission’s ‘technocratic shadow administration’ in Brussels has come under increased public attack. Case studies have pointed to the influential role of expert groups on the Commission’s policy proposals. Publicly, critical voices, such as the non-governmental organization ALTER-EU, have portrayed the European Commission as a ‘captive’ of industry-dominated expert groups. Also the European Parliament has repeatedly criticized an imbalanced composition of expert groups and a lack of transparency in their work. In 2011 and 2014 the European Parliament set a budget reserve on the Commission’s budget for expert groups, which was conditional to a series of reforms by the Commission, such as strengthening balanced representation of different interests in expert groups, addressing conflicts of interest of participants, and ensuring transparency in the work of expert groups.

Thus, in the public debate Commission expert groups are increasingly seen as far more than technocratic deliberation arenas or impartial providers of factual data. However, we lack systematic insights into the Commission’s daily work with its expert groups. This book challenges the myth that Commission expert groups are purely technocratic bodies by asking: How does the European Commission use its expert groups in the policy process? And, which factors explain variation in the Commission’s usage of expert groups?

Three types of expert group use

In my book I argue that if we want to understand the role of expert groups in the policy process, it is essential to investigate the motivations of the formal institution that consults these bodies. I therefore focus on the European Commission’s reasons for consulting expert groups and on how the Commission’s Directorates-General use these committees in the EU policy process. More concretely, I assume that the European Commission consults with expert groups because it depends on its environment for resources it needs when preparing legislative initiatives – and expert group can provide these resources. Thus, a resource exchange between the Commission and its expert groups takes place. Following this idea, I develop a typology of expert-group use, which is based on the most important resource that expert groups provide.

  • A problem-solving use of expert groups is most important for a technocratically motivated Commission engaged in finding efficient solutions to problems. It refers to instances in which the European Commission acquires expertise and information from its expert committees. In these cases, expert groups can be seen as a means for the Commission to manage its internal lack of expertise when addressing complex policy problems. The Commission uses expertise ‘cognitively’ (Dreger, 2014) or ‘instrumentally’ to solve policy problems (see also Boswell, 2009; Rimkuté and Haverland, 2015).
  • A substantiating use occurs when the European Commission involves expert groups to acquire and signal support for its preferred policy positions. In these cases, expert groups are used ‘argumentatively’ (Dreger, 2014) to justify the Commission’s policy choices against other actors. As opposed to the problem-solving use, the Commission’s focus lies not on efficient problem solving, but on maximizing its gains and on the preferences of other actors. Here, policy proposals are not based on efficiency concerns, rather reflect the will of powerful actors. The Commission is predominantly concerned about the positions of veto players in the European decision-making process – thus, the Council and European Parliament.
  • In the case of a consensus-building use, committees are not valued for their informative or supportive expertise, but for their institutional framework. In expert groups, relevant actors can meet, exchange (contradicting) views, and reach agreements. Here, expert groups are not seen as arenas for expertise, but as assemblies that broker out compromises, with the Commission demanding ‘consensual positions’ from its committees. Similar to the substantiating use, here the Commission’s focus is directed towards the political feasibility of policy solutions rather than towards their technical efficiency or effectiveness.

A frequent and multimodal use of expert groups

The book shows that the Commission’s administration draws heavily on expert groups when preparing legislation and indeed uses them for multiple purposes. This finding is visible in various empirical analyses. First, the book provides a quantitative overview of the Commission’s expert group system, including a network analysis, which is based on data from the Commission’s online expert group register. Here I identify patterns that indicate that not only technocratic concerns seem to motivate the European Commission when working with expert groups. The analyses further show that Commission expert groups are not all alike, rather vary substantially in their institutional frameworks. The main part of the book discusses four expert groups in the area of research and innovation policy and their role when preparing policy initiatives. These insights are then compared to the Commission’s use of expert groups across three policy areas – research and innovation, the intersection of social and internal market policy, and consumer policy. This cross-sectoral analysis uses data from a multi-annual collaborative research project on ‘Position formation in the EU Commission’ conducted at the WZB Social Science Centre Berlin, which traces the Commission’s drafting processes of 48 legislative proposals from 1999 to 2009 (Hartlapp et al., 2014).

The analyses reveal that the European Commission worked intensively with expert groups across all three policy areas: in almost three quarter of the policy processes the responsible Directorates-General consulted expert groups. In addition to expert groups, the Commission services also used various other consultation channels. The book therefore shows that, rather than merely working as a technocratic institution in isolation, the European Commission responds to political demands and developments in its environment, and uses expert groups to help to manage its dependencies.

Thereby, a political mode of expert-group usage – subsuming the substantiating and the consensus-building uses – occurred just as often in the Commission as a technocratic mode. In addition, routinized behavior and traditions developed over time guide the Commission in its consultation of expert groups: the Commission’s Directorates-General displayed distinct patterns and preferences regarding the way they manage their resource dependencies with their environment and work with expert groups. While some Commission services examined in the book worked closely together with expert groups across various types of initiatives or policy areas, others did so more selectively. DG Research, for example, involved a whole battery of expert groups across several initiatives under its responsibility, while the DG for Information Society used expert groups more selectively.

Finally, while conceptually three ideal types of expert group use were constructed, empirically I found a multimodal use of expert groups. In most cases, a Directorate-General used its expert group not only in one, but in several different ways when preparing an initiative. My study can account for a multimodal use by showing that within one drafting process, several resources can be critical for the Commission, which therefore uses its expert groups in various ways. For example, while technical expertise was needed at the beginning, substantiating expertise was often needed towards the end of a process to support the Commission’s proposals against opposition in the Council and European Parliament.

Thus, when the Commission’s Directorates-General consult expert groups, they are anything but driven only by technocratic concerns (i.e., the quest for specialized knowledge), rather are also guided by political motives. Often, Commission services also anticipate political decision making in the Council and European Parliament and are aware of the political implications of their decisions.

Dr. Julia Metz is an advisor at the German Parliament. She holds a doctoral degree from the Freie Universität Berlin and has previously worked as a senior researcher at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and at the University of Bremen, Germany. Her work covers the areas of public administration and European governance, and has appeared in, among others, the Journal of European Integration and in Policy and Society.

This entry was initially posted on Europe of Knowledge blog.

References

Boswell, C. (2009) The Political Uses of Expert Knowlegde: Immigration Policy and Social Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Dreger, J. (2014) The European Commission’s Energy and Climate Policy: A Climate for Expertise? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Hartlapp, M., J. Metz, and C. Rauh (2014) Which Policy for Europe? Power and Conflict inside the European Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Rimkuté, D. and M. Haverland (2015) ‘How does the European Commission use scientific expertise? Results from a survey of scientific members of the Commission’s expert committees’, Comparative European Politics 13 (4): 430–449.

How do European institutions use scientific expertise?

Dovilė Rimkutė

Photo Credits: Wikimedia Commons

Photo Credits: Wikimedia Commons

As Majone (1999) has observed, the approval of EU authority – as a predominantly regulatory political system – is based on the perception that supranational regulation corrects market failures by relying on a technical exercise and scientific knowledge managed by independent regulators, e.g. the European Commission and European independent agencies. Experts and scientific knowledge has played a key role in EU politics and its significance is increasing as well as takes on new shapes (Gornitzka and Holst, 2015). However, against this backdrop, an increasing body of literature has observed that scientific experts’ involvement in regulatory processes is rather contested (Gornitzka and Holst, 2015; Schrefler, 2010; Radaelli, 2009; Boswell, 2008). Scholars argue that even though regulatory duties are deemed to be a highly scientific pursuit predominantly focused on the technical-instrumental use of scientific knowledge, expertise can actually have many functions in policy/decision-making. That is, alongside the technical-instrumental (or problem-solving) use of knowledge, European regulators can also employ strategic or symbolic uses of scientific expertise.

To that end, the recent publications of Rimkutė and Haverland (2015) and Rimkutė (2015) contribute to this scholarship focusing on the role and functions of scientific knowledge by empirically examining how expertise is used by European regulators and by providing theoretical explanations regarding the variance in scientific knowledge use by supranational regulators.

How do scientists perceive their role in EU policy-making?

The article entitled “How does the European Commission use scientific expertise? Results from a survey of scientific members of the Commission’s expert committees” builds on the recent scholarship introducing a typology of knowledge use (Schrefler, 2010; Radaelli, 2009; Boswell, 2008) and suggests further improvements in its conceptualisation and operationalization, however, in particular it aims at empirical contribution. The article informs the debates on the role of scientific expertise in European Union policy-making, a query that is particularly relevant in the case of the Commission’s exclusive responsibility and duty to initiate proposals. In this article, we sought to go beyond the existing case studies by systematically tapping into the use of scientific knowledge across various policy issues and Directorates General (DG) of the Commission. We contribute to the literature with a large-N study in which we surveyed more than a 100 scientists who had participated in the Commission expert groups. In particular, we focused on how scientists’ advice was used by the Commission, and asked: what attitudes do scientists providing scientific advice to the European Commission hold regarding their contribution to policies shaped and adapted at the EU level? How do scientists perceive their role in EU policy-making?

When and under what conditions different uses of scientific expertise prevail 

The article “Explaining Differences in Scientific Expertise Use: The Politics of Pesticides” further explores how European regulator – European regulatory agencies – actually contend with their core tasks of providing scientific advice to EU institutions. In this contribution, I go one step further and contribute to the theoretical explanation of when and under what conditions different uses of scientific knowledge prevail. I draw upon the theoretical insights of sociological institutionalism and resource dependence theory. The core argument of the article is that whether the regulatory policy process can yield efficient and credible problem-solving solutions is contingent upon both (1) the external environment in which a certain scientific output production process takes place, i.e. the level of formal and informal pressure and (2) the internal agency’s capacity to produce science-based outputs (Rimkutė, 2015: 116).

Risk assessments by the European Food Safety Authority 

In empirical analysis, I focus on one type of knowledge use – strategic substantiating – that refers to those practices in which an agency seeks to promote and justify its own or external actors’ predetermined preferences, which are based on certain values, political or economic interests. The strategic substantiating use of scientific knowledge is expected to occur under the conditions of high external pressure and high scientific capacity. To test this theoretical expectation, the case of the neonicotinoid pesticides risk assessment for bees has been selected. The risk assessment has been produced by the key European risk assessor in food safety regulation – European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The empirical analysis combines a variety of data sources including official documents, press releases, scientific outputs, and 10 semi-structured interviews with the academic and industry experts involved in the process.

Specifically, the case of neonicotinoid pesticides has been selected as EFSA in this particular case possessed a high capacity to produce scientific expertise because it successfully mobilised internal human resources: the largest EFSA’s unit—the Pesticides Unit— was in charge of drafting scientific outputs. In addition, EFSA had much sound external research evidence at its disposal when drafting scientific conclusions: extensive sources of expertise, data, knowledge, and understanding of honeybees and the neonicotinoid pesticides. However, the organisational field in which EFSA had to deliver its scientific opinion consisted of defined opposing positions (laboratory research vs. field research) and the conflicting configurations of inter-organisational structures competing with each other (industry vs. beekeeping associations and NGOs). The biggest chemical manufacturers in Europe, Bayer CropScience, Syngenta AG, have been actively involved in the process and in due course have filed legal actions challenging the Commission’s restrictions and accused the Commission of not relying on the entire scientific evidence available and, in so doing, they challenged the EU pesticide regulation.

The article empirically illustrated that such conditions paved the way for the strategic substantiating use of expertise. It concludes that the interaction between high external pressure and high internal capacity leads to the strategic substantiating use of expertise, in which scientific evidence is used to promote the inclinations of actors upon which the agency depends most.

This study develops starting points for further research as it introduced a general theory explaining the differences in scientific expertise use, which have been tested only partly and in one particular context, i.e. one issue within one EU regulatory agency. However, the theoretical argument of the article could be said to be relevant to all expertise bodies acting on the basis of scientific knowledge, including the Commission, comitology committees, national agencies, international organisations, or other executive, regulatory or information bodies whose expertise feeds into various policy-making stages. To that end, I suggest that testing the theoretical explanations outlined in the article in different contexts would clearly be a requisite for further research.

Dovilė Rimkutė has been a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München, Germany since March 2014. Before joining LMU she held a Marie Curie scholarship for Early Stage Researchers and worked as a Research Associate at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Her research interests cover a range of European Union policy/decision-making topics, however, risk regulation and evidence-based governance in EU regulatory processes and factors affecting it take a central role. In her PhD research, Dovilė examines regulatory science practices employed by EU (quasi-) risk regulators – European regulatory agencies – by drawing upon the theoretical insights of sociological institutionalism and resource dependence theory. Contact: Dovile.rimke@gmail.com

References:

Boswell, C. (2008). The political functions of expert knowledge: Knowledge and legitimation in European Union immigration policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(4), 471-488.

Gornitzka, Å. and Holst, C. (2015). The Expert-Executive Nexus in the EU: An Introduction. Politics and Governance, 3 (1): 1-21

Majone, G. (1999). ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’, West European Politics, 22 (1): 1-13.

Radaelli, C.M. (2009). Measuring policy learning across Europe: regulatory impact assessment in comparative perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (8): 1145–1164.

Rimkute, D. (2015). Explaining differences in scientific expertise use: The politics of pesticides. Politics and Governance, 3 (1): 114-127.

Rimkute, D. and Haverland, M. (2015). How does the European Commission use scientific expertise? Results from a survey of scientific members of the Commission’s expert committees. Comparative European Politics, 13 (4): 430–449.

Schrefler, L. (2010). The usage of scientific knowledge by independent regulatory agencies. Governance, 23(2): 309-330.

This entry was initially posted on Europe of Knowledge blog.